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On 27 April 2016, Federica Mogherini (the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy) and Karmenu Vella 
(Commissioner for Environment, Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries) presented the third take – 
following the earlier statements from 2008 and 
2012 (European Commission 2008; 2012) – on 
the EU-Arctic nexus. The new Joint 
Communication is titled “An integrated 
European Union policy for the Arctic”. The new 
policy statement was requested by the Council 
of the European Union in 2014 and was 
preceded – for the first time – by a consultation 
process. The document provides a broad 
overview of various aspects of EU presence in 
the Arctic region. It proposes also a few – albeit 
not particularly many – ideas for future actions. 
The document does so within three “priority 
areas”: 
• Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic 
Environment; 
• Sustainable Development in and around the 
Arctic; 
• International Cooperation on Arctic Issues. 
In this ArCticle – the first of the new Arctic 
Centre series – we provide our perspective on a 
few elements that are novel and particularly 
interesting. The Communication proclaims itself 
to be a proposal for an “integrated EU Arctic 
policy”. We therefore discuss what an 
“integrated policy” could mean in the EU 
context and ask whether it is possible to 
“integrate” the diverse fields of EU-Arctic 
affairs. Further, we turn to the aspects that point 
to an on-going change in the EU’s approach to 
the Arctic: an increased focus on the 
development of the European Arctic, as well as 
the proposed coordination of the EU Arctic-
related funding, which also entails enhanced 
stakeholder engagement. Finally, we discuss the 
external dimension of the EU’s Arctic policy and 
its location in the broader circumpolar setting of 
Arctic cooperation and the Union’s upcoming 
Global Strategy. 
We leave the analysis of the Union’s engagement 
in climate mitigation and adaptation, research, 
and the EU’s position on Arctic maritime 
shipping and hydrocarbon extractions to others. 
We do so because these aspects changed little in 
the new Communication as compared to 
previous policy statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
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The new Arctic Communication is supposed to 
set the stage for an “integrated EU Arctic 
policy.” If taking the common understanding of 
the word “integrated” - making the policy more 
than just a sum of its many parts -, this policy is 
not delivering. Considering the nature of the 
cross-cutting Arctic policy—of marginal interest 
to the EU—we claim it is highly unlikely that this 
document will lead to enhanced coherence and 
integration. This is even more true as the Arctic, 
until recently considered geo-economically ‘hot’, 
may not be that attractive anymore due to low 
oil and other commodity prices such as minerals, 
as well as the sluggish rise in Arctic shipping 
(Humpert 2014; SADA 2014; Käpylä and 
Mikkola 2015). However, if assessed against 
other standards than “integration,” the EU’s 
perception of its place in the Arctic and its focus 
show a few clear signs of progress. 
Before we get too 
excited: words without 
meaning 
In May 2014, the Council of the European 
Union—the EU institution that brings together 
representatives of the 28 EU member states—
requested the European Commission and High 
Representative (HR) to work towards “further 
development of an integrated and coherent 
Arctic Policy” (Council of the European Union 
2014). The new Communication was therefore 
meant to develop the EU’s Arctic policy as an 
integrated one, and it dutifully does so in the title 
and throughout the text. However, despite these 
references, the policy update lacks a proper 
definition of what “integrated” actually means in 
the EU-Arctic context. To be blunt, even the 
academic community of EU (foreign) policy 
researchers tends to accept commonly used 
catchphrases such as “integrated,” “coherent,” 
or “overarching” without scrutinizing what 
stands behind these policy slogans. 
Earlier, the authors of this analysis (Stępień and 
Raspotnik 2015) identified constraints for 
formulating a coherent and comprehensive 
framework governing diverse aspects of the 
EU’s presence in the Arctic. To put it simply, the 
scope and number of Arctic-relevant issues is 
too broad, their diversity too great and the 
position of Arctic affairs in EU policymaking 
too marginal for a coherent policy to emerge, i.e. 
one that produces synergies (with different 
Arctic-relevant actions supporting one another) 
between different Arctic-relevant actions. And 
the idea of “integration” could indicate an even 
more ambitious policy undertaking, making 
Arctic policy something more than just a sum of 
its parts. The challenge arises from the very 
nature of the EU Arctic policy, which 
incorporates a diversity of both internal and 
external issues. We focus on the former in Part 
II (p. 8) and on the latter in Part III (p. 14) of 
this analysis. 
Integrated into one: a 
single Arctic policy? 
Policy integration occurs in at least three 
varieties. First, integration can mean bringing 
different sectors together to form a single policy 
guided by one set of objectives. That has been 
attempted in fields such as rural policy (e.g., 
Jordan and Halpin 2006), youth policy or the 
EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). The 
latter is particularly instructive. Although 
analysts have often criticized that fisheries, 
environmental policy, maritime transport, 
regional development, and offshore energy still 
I. DECONSTRUCTING 
“INTEGRATED”: THE 
NATURE OF THE “EU 
ARCTIC POLICY” 
AND ITS LIMITS  
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go their own ways, some progress towards 
bringing these policies closer to one another has 
been achieved. This is due to the application of 
common principles and concrete instruments, 
mainly the ecosystem approach and maritime 
spatial planning. The ecosystem approach has 
indeed started to filter into sectoral policy-
making, in particular with regards to fisheries, 
the environment and—to a lesser extent—
regional development. Integrated maritime 
spatial planning is a slow process but, induced 
through EU legislation (Directive 
2014/89/EU), it makes a difference throughout 
European seas. In contrast to these examples, 
the Arctic policy is not likely to lead to that type 
of integration. Creating a single policy out of the 
EU’s various Arctic-relevant sectors seems 
hardly feasible. This does not seem to be the 
intention of EU policymakers. As a matter of 
fact, in the 2016 policy update, the Commission 
and the HR no longer talk about common Arctic 
policy objectives (which would guide action in 
all components of Arctic policy). These are now 
called - appropriately - “priority areas”; basically, 
aspects, not goals, of EU presence in the Arctic: 
• Climate change and safeguarding the 
Arctic environment 
• Sustainable development in and around 
the Arctic 
• International cooperation on Arctic 
issues 
Integrated into sectoral 
policies: 
mainstreaming Arctic 
issues? 
The second type of policy integration relates to 
cross-cutting issues feeding into various sectors 
of state or EU activity. The most obvious case 
for this is environmental and climate policy 
integration (Lafferty and Hovden 2003; 
Mickwitz et al. 2010). Over the last decades – at 
least in the EU and many of its member states – 
environmental issues and climate policy targets 
have indeed found their way into such fields as 
transport, agriculture, fisheries, and regional 
development. 
Could Arctic issues be integrated into wider 
sectoral policymaking in a similar fashion? 
Perhaps. The Joint Communication is not a 
definite statement of the EU’s policy towards 
the Arctic as it - in principle - is to inform other 
EU institutions on the position of the 
Commission and the HR. Nonetheless, it can be 
considered as an authoritative guidance to 
Commission services and it is likely to be 
endorsed by the Council. The text of the 2016 
Communication states that “[t]his policy 
document should guide the EU’s actions for the 
coming years”. However, the marginal character 
of the EU’s Arctic policy in the broader 
European policy framework makes it rather 
challenging for Arctic-specific concerns to 
noticeably affect the course of EU policy-
making in sectors such as environmental policy, 
agriculture, fisheries, transport or strategies for 
resource supply. Single cases exist where Arctic 
policy did indeed have some influence. From the 
dawn of the EU’s Arctic-focused policymaking, 
the Arctic started to pop-up in different 
contexts, from mineral resources and energy 
(e.g. Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations, referring to 
promotion of international standards for Arctic 
hydrocarbons extraction), to maritime traffic 
legislation (e.g. Directive 2009/17/EC on vessel 
traffic monitoring and information systems, 
referring to ice conditions). As another example, 
the Northern Periphery Programme became the 
Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme in 
2014, albeit this was primarily a case of 
relabelling than actual change. 
As a matter of fact, the policy statement 
provides some possibilities for further 
integration of Arctic issues. One example is the 
option of including protecting the Central Arctic 
Ocean into the EU’s position in the currently 
ArCticles – May 2016 – Adam Stępień and Andreas Raspotnik 4 
 
 
 
commencing UN negotiations on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction 
or the high seas. Another example is a possible 
– although difficult to implement—adjustment 
in the EU’s definition of key transport networks 
to support transport connections on the 
Europe’s North-South axis have been assessed 
as underdeveloped. Moreover, the proposed 
forum and network for national and regional 
authorities from European Arctic and managing 
authorities of EU programs (see Part II), which 
shall support EU Arctic funding cooperation—
could lead to adjustments in the future set-up of 
EU structural funding. However, examples of 
proposals to mainstream Arctic issues into 
broader, pan-EU decision-making processes are 
few and uncertain as regards implementation. 
Integrated “laundry 
list”: Building on the 
EU’s general policies? 
The third way to understand “integrated policy” 
concerns the policy itself that could eventually 
be integrated into existing frameworks, policies 
and activities. EU policymakers sometimes seem 
to apply this line of thinking, as shown in their 
analysis of the added value of macro-regional 
strategies (European Commission 2013). 
Simply, an integrated policy would mean here 
one that builds on and takes account of 
principles and objectives of general sectoral 
policies (like climate, environment, transport or 
regional development). 
To some extent, this is exactly what the new 
Arctic Communication does. We learn that EU 
activities in the Arctic will be in line with EU 
climate mitigation and adaptation policies or the 
EU Maritime Security Strategy from 2014. The 
expected evolution of the EU’s overall cohesion 
policy towards greater focus on investment 
loans might lead to a decrease of funding 
available for the European Arctic regions 
through regional and cross-border programmes 
(e.g., Janson 2016), showing how dependent the 
EU’s actions in the Arctic are on its overall 
policy frameworks. 
The result is that the Communication – similarly 
to its predecessor – remains a set of “statements 
of fact rather than commitments to action, 
which appear to be in great part a continuation 
or intensification of existing activities at EU, 
bilateral or multilateral level”, as Airoldi (2014) 
concluded at the previous 2012 Joint 
Communication. The 2016 document largely 
constitutes a list numerous activities, studies, 
and projects that have already taken place and 
provides fairly few examples of actions yet to be 
taken: from existing satellite technologies, 
through on-going operation of the EU-Polarnet 
(formulating the European Polar Research 
Programme), to very specific projects to be 
continued, like the development of multi-
resolution maps of the Arctic seabed. Proposals 
for future activities are few. The 
Communication is certainly not an action plan.  
 
 
Infographic: European Commission, 
Twitter #EUArctic 
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The EU Arctic policy as 
“anything that gets to 
be implemented” 
The so-called “EU Arctic policy” is in fact a 
policy on “anything that gets to be 
implemented”. Eventually, we should perhaps 
accept it as such – as an overview of the EU’s 
Arctic-relevant policies and actions – and thus, 
limit our expectations boosted by the 
Commission/HR’s claim of establishing an 
“integrated policy”, a policy that is something 
more than just a sum of its parts. 
The primary role of the Communication is not 
to streamline EU Arctic policies and actions but 
to communicate the scope of the EU’s presence 
in the region, to show that the Union has an 
appropriate understanding of the situation in the 
region and to state overall principles that the EU 
commits to follow in its diverse Arctic activities. 
The key audiences are the Arctic states, EU 
member states, and to some extent the general 
public. Neumann (2007) famously asked “why 
diplomats never produce anything new”, 
suggesting that diplomatic statements are about 
diplomats communicating with one another 
with the assumption that all relevant issues need 
to be mentioned, with one common voice and 
emphasis upheld. While the EU Arctic 
communication is not exactly an external 
relations statement – it cuts across external and 
internal affairs – it also has to incorporate all 
possible Arctic-relevant issues. That is because 
not mentioning something would become a 
statement in itself. 
As a result, the Communication’s authors had 
little choice but to present an ever longer list of 
Arctic-relevant aspects of EU activity: research, 
resources, sustainable development, dialogue 
with Indigenous Peoples, Arctic Council as a 
primary forum for circumpolar cooperation, 
UNCLOS as a key legal framework for Arctic 
Ocean, etc. Considering the number of aspects 
brought under the umbrella of the EU Arctic 
policy, limiting many aspects to being just 
mentioned - resulting in the document looking 
like a long “laundry list” (Østhagen 2013) - is 
perhaps a blessing as more substance would turn 
the Communication into a 200-page-long report. 
Limits to the EU’s 
influence 
The lack of policy integration is coupled with the 
Commission’s and the HR/European External 
Action Service’s (EEAS) understanding of the 
limits on the EU’s ability to influence 
developments that are important in and for the 
Arctic. The EU can only “encourage” its 
international partners to speedily ratify the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury and the 
Ballast Water Convention, both yet to enter into 
force. Moreover, it can only urge Arctic states to 
effectively implement the Stockholm 
Convention on persistent organic pollutants 
(although the dialogue with China would be 
rather important from an Arctic perspective), 
where the EU itself has done a relatively good 
job (DG Environment website). What is missing 
in this list of encouragements is any call for 
limiting the use of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic, a 
measure that has not found its way into the 
mandatory Polar Code. This is strongly opposed 
by Russia, as the country is concerned about the 
costs of operating its domestic Arctic 
destinational shipping. Despite declaring a “duty 
to protect the Arctic environment” and being a 
“global leader in science”—two essential 
components that aim to highlight the Union’s 
Arctic credibility—the EU is a secondary 
participant to many Arctic institutions and 
attempts to tread carefully as to not offend 
Arctic states. Unfortunately, too often the 
fundamental question as to how the EU could 
encourage its partners or facilitate developments 
is unanswered in the 2016 Joint Communication. 
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Summary 
In conclusion, it is difficult to imagine that EU 
officials who specifically deal with Arctic issues 
can formulate a strong cross-cutting framework, 
let alone make a significant impact on larger 
processes taking place in the EU. Considering 
that an integrated Arctic policy is a rather 
unlikely creature, perhaps it is time for the EU 
to issue Arctic statements on more specific 
issues. What is the role of the Arctic region in 
the Union’s implementation of the Paris 
Agreement? What are the implications for the 
EU’s Arctic-relevant activities stemming from 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
adopted in 2015, relevant in principle for the 
whole world and mentioned in the new 
Communication? Is it possible to have a policy 
statement focused on the European Arctic - 
perhaps as an outcome of the European Arctic 
Stakeholder Forum process - as a part of the new 
framework for the regional policy in the next EU 
budgeting period 2021-2027? 
Although the EU’s Arctic policy will to a great 
extent remain a mere listing of EU Arctic-
relevant activities, it certainly does not mean that 
it is irrelevant. It is important as a way of 
communicating EU Arctic activities and general 
principles the EU and its institutions 
acknowledge. The process of drafting a 
communication also makes EU officials reflect 
on the EU’s overall place in the region (Stępień 
2015). Eventually, the new document does 
propose some more concrete outputs regarding 
European Arctic affairs and possibilities for 
future coordination within the EU institutions, 
as well as coordination of various sources of EU 
Arctic funding. 
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The new Joint Communication includes several 
aspects that show further change in thinking 
about the Arctic in the EU’s headquarters in 
Brussels. While the general statements on 
climate, Arctic Ocean-related affairs and 
international cooperation have remained largely 
unaltered over the years, the increased focus on 
the European Arctic and finding ways to 
enhance coordination of Arctic-relevant EU 
actions are signs of change. First, the European 
Arctic regions and their development have been 
finally given a prominent place. Second, as 
regards economic development, greater 
attention is paid to a broad range of new sectors 
and opportunities rather than to overblown 
expectations of hydrocarbon or minerals 
extraction or maritime shipping. In the context 
of the European Arctic, extractive industries 
practically disappeared from the purview of the 
new policy statement. Third, the EU proposes 
some concrete measures to coordinate its Arctic-
relevant funding. Enhancing intra-institutional 
coordination within the Council and the 
European Parliament (EP) is also proposed. The 
Communication reveals future risks related to a 
possible shift in the EU’s regional funding and 
to relative silence on environmental questions in 
discussion on economic development in the 
European Arctic. Also, concerning the 
economic development in the European Arctic, 
the indigenous - that is primarily Sámi - 
perspective is virtually absent. 
 
More European and 
more economic 
development-focused 
policy 
One of the most visible changes in comparison 
to the 2012 Communication (European 
Commission 2012) is the place of Europe’s 
northernmost regions and their closest 
neighbourhood in the reflection on the EU’s 
role in the Arctic. European Arctic issues have 
now fully become an integral component of 
what the EU considers as its Arctic affairs. One 
of the main points of criticism concerning 
previous Arctic policy initiatives was the policy’s 
geographic orientation towards the broader 
circumpolar North and maritime Arctic. There 
were calls for a stronger focus on (sub-)Arctic 
areas that are closer to Europe’s centre 
(Østhagen & Raspotnik 2015; Stepien et al. 
2014), including calls coming from the Europe’s 
northernmost regions (NSPA 2015). One could 
argue that it is the European North that could 
be the EU’s gateway into the Arctic and not the 
tedious and long-lasting discussions on Arctic 
Council observer status (Keil & Raspotnik 
2013). 
Sustainable development remains the central 
concept in the EU policy, in line with a maxim 
that one can make any issue good by putting the 
word sustainable in front of it. Sustainability is 
now also fashionably coupled with “resilience”, 
which appears throughout the document. 
Referring to “sustainable development” rather 
than the protection or utilization of the Arctic 
has also become an imperative when publicly 
and politically discussing the future of the Arctic 
region, especially for actors considered external 
to the region (Raspotnik & Østhagen 2014). 
“Sustainable development” circumvents 
accusations that the EU wants to turn the Arctic 
II. MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE: THE 
EUROPEAN ARCTIC 
AND BETTER 
COORDINATION  
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into a national park and that its interest is solely 
in exploiting northern riches. Thus, the new 
document includes an assurance that sustainable 
development should be pursued “taking into 
account both the traditional livelihoods of those 
living in the region and the impact of economic 
development on the Arctic's fragile 
environment.”  
While the Communication’s paragraphs that 
refer to the Circumpolar Arctic appear to show 
a stronger environmental focus, those on the 
European Arctic define “sustainable 
development in and around the Arctic” 
primarily as “sustainable economic 
development” and “sustainable innovation”. 
There is a new emphasis on the role of non-
extractive sectors and new technologies, but 
growth and investments are the key 
catchphrases. This mirrors the overall approach 
of the Juncker Commission, i.e. one focused on 
jobs, growth and investment. 
 
 
 
 
Infographic: European Commission, Twitter #EUArctic 
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Innovative Europe’s 
northernmost regions? 
In the 2012 Joint Communication the main 
concern was “the sustainable use of resources” 
with other economic activities treated as 
supplementary. In the 2016 statement, the shift 
to the European Arctic combined with the less 
optimistic outlook for large-scale energy, 
mineral and transport developments leads to a 
reversal of the earlier focus, with a broader 
notion of (sustainable) multifaceted economic 
development moving to central position. 
Extractive industries are hardly mentioned, and 
if they are, it is mostly in the context of 
international cooperation. Instead, much space 
is given to innovation, prospects of small and 
medium enterprises, connectivity, bioeconomy, 
information technologies, renewable energy, and 
cold-climate technologies. This closely reflects 
the current discussion on the prospects for 
regional development in Northern 
Fennoscandia (Lapland Chamber of Commerce 
2016). 
The new document looks at the European Arctic 
in two different ways: from the European 
perspective and from the Arctic perspective. 
The former refers to the European 
northernmost regions, depicting the regions as 
peripheral and disadvantaged. This perspective 
could lead to securing much cherished special 
allocation within structural funding – an 
allocation the northernmost regions have so far 
enjoyed due to their permanent structural and 
climatic handicaps in comparison to other parts 
of the EU (Janson 2016). Improving the 
northernmost regions’ access to the EU’s single 
market – partly through digital solutions – is 
another sign of the appreciation for challenges 
of peripherality.  
The accessibility of the region could be also 
improved through hard infrastructure, such as 
through North-South transport connections. 
While the latter is merely hinted at in the new 
Communication, it brings some hope to Finnish 
dreams of a railway between Southern Lapland 
and the Arctic Ocean. (Hope if you are a 
municipality official or mining industry 
representative, fear if you are a Sámi reindeer 
herder from North-East Finnish Lapland.) It 
remains to be seen whether funding 
opportunities are reflected in the upcoming EU 
sever-year budget perspective, where net 
contributors to the EU budget – like Sweden – 
push for cutting the Union’s budget. It is also to 
be seen whether any funding for infrastructural 
projects – if materialized – would be supported 
at least in a small part by direct funding 
(Connecting Europe Facility or European 
Regional Development Fund) or rather by 
investment loans. 
However, the perception of the northernmost 
European regions changes when we look at 
them from the perspective of the circumpolar 
Arctic: from this point of view the European 
Arctic is not peripheral but comparatively rich, 
well-connected and highly innovative. In this 
reading, the region could be central to 
Arctic railway proposal between Gulf of 
Bothnia, Finnish Lapland and the Arctic 
Ocean. Source: Arctic corridor at 
www.arcticcorridor.fi  
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development of (ideally cleaner) technologies, 
know-how, and environmentally sustainable 
technological solutions for activities in the 
Arctic. The Communication embraces these 
ideas with references to cold-climate solutions, 
the development of “Arctic standards” for 
processes and technologies, emphasis on 
northern SMEs, collaborative (sharing) 
economy and circular economy (growth 
decoupled from extraction of new resources). 
The latter are in fact new EU-wide hip policy 
phrases. Such a new (as seen from Brussels) way 
of thinking of the developmental potential of 
European Arctic regions is particularly strongly 
present also in Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic 
region (Prime Minister’s Office 2013) and 
various reports discussing Finnish and Nordic 
Arctic affairs (Lipponen 2015; Husebekk et al. 
2015; Olsen et al. 2016). There, Arctic and cold-
climate solutions are to become one of the 
drivers for regional and national growth. This 
emerging coherence of EU, national and local 
priorities is certainly a welcome development. 
A major change in general EU policies - of great 
importance for the European Arctic - is the 
expected shift from structural funding towards 
investment financing. For instance, the new 
document points to the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) as a source for funding for 
Fennoscandian cross-border projects.  
If after 2020 the EU financial support shifts 
further towards investment financing (and it 
currently appears rather likely), one possibility to 
consider for the EU could be to secure dedicated 
loan facilities for European Arctic projects, as 
they may often lose the competition for such 
resources to Europe’s economic and technology 
powerhouses, located to the south. An example 
is the Nordic Investment Bank, which has 
recently established an Arctic Financing Facility, 
dedicating EUR 500 million exclusively for 
“high north projects” (NIB website). A similar 
small, targeted programme within the EIB could 
be considered, but the Communication makes 
no such proposal. Instead, every time the 
support of the EU investment mechanisms is 
mentioned in the Communication, the ominous 
phrase “could help” appears, this telling 
European Arctic actors: “there are pan-
European loans and funds available, so try to 
fund your needs from these sources”. 
While it is appreciable that the Commission tries 
to find ways for making northernmost regions 
more economically viable and less reliant on 
extractive industries and support from the south, 
perhaps it is high time to openly acknowledge 
that the character of northern, sparsely 
populated regions requires a certain on-going 
degree of support from Brussels and national 
capitals in terms of infrastructure, service-
provision, and the maintenance of living 
standards in the North. That does not mean that 
these regions cannot be innovative and produce 
added value for the rest of Europe and the 
Circumpolar Arctic. However, national and 
European expectations that remote parts of the 
continent become self-reliant and economically 
resilient – which stems from the language of the 
Joint Communication – may push regional and 
local policy-makers in the North to ultimately 
rely on extractive industries and sacrificing 
environmental concerns, in contradiction to EU 
policy priorities.  
 
Corina Creţu, EU Commissioner for 
Regional Policy meeting Esko Lotvonen, 
Mayor of Rovaniemi, following EU Citizen’s 
Dialogue in Rovaniemi, 16.02.2016.  
Source: EC Audiovisual Services 
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Enhancing 
coordination and 
engagement? 
The most concrete output of the new 
Communication are new frameworks for better 
coordination of the EU’s Arctic activities. 
Creating such venues for coordination was 
called for by some European Arctic 
stakeholders, as well as the authors of this piece 
(Stepien et al. 2014; Stępień and Raspotnik 
2015). 
First, a temporary forum – called misleadingly 
“European Arctic stakeholder forum” – for 
“enhancing collaboration between different EU 
funding programmes” is to be established. It 
could be considered a direct result of the 
Council’s 2014 conclusions and the 2014-2015 
consultations on streamlining EU Arctic 
funding. 
Composed of national (open also to Greenland, 
Iceland and Norway), regional and local 
authorities, the new forum will attempt to define 
“key investment and research priorities” for EU 
funds by the end of 2017. The forum will be 
complemented by a network of managing 
authorities and stakeholders from various EU 
programmes. It is unclear how these processes 
are to relate to the EU-Polarnet project, which 
works on European Polar research priorities, 
also through a broad stakeholder engagement. A 
certain degree of overlap regarding the research 
dimension seems unavoidable. Moreover, 
participation of indigenous peoples and their 
organizations - chiefly the Sámi and the 
Greenlandic Inuit - in the new forums is not 
mentioned. This is disturbing as the 
communication brings up the question of 
North-South transport infrastructure or 
renewable energy projects, and not all of the 
projects currently considered are seen 
favourably by indigenous representatives. 
It is somewhat disappointing that funding fora 
are to be temporary in nature, but in the current 
state of a semi-permanent crisis in the EU, it is a 
miracle that they are at all considered. After 
2017, the envisaged annual Arctic stakeholder 
conference – perhaps similar to those taking 
place in macro-regions like the Baltic or the 
Atlantic – may serve as the continuation of the 
European Arctic Stakeholder Forum’s work.  
Bringing different EU programmes together is 
something that has been proposed by various 
actors and analysts for some years. In light of 
limited EU resources that currently mainly 
facilitate networking or support smaller projects, 
exploring possibilities for pulling together 
resources into joint calls is indeed one of the 
possible outputs of the proposed coordination 
fora. In light of the envisaged emphasis on 
investment financing, the role of the EIB in 
these coordination frameworks may be of key 
importance.  
Second, while not mentioned in the 
Communication, the Commission has started to 
look for a partner to implement something 
dubbed “EU Arctic Policy Dialogue and 
Outreach” (EC Ted website). It includes 
organizing several major events with Arctic 
stakeholders in Brussels and the North. How 
such a process would look like specifically, what 
sort of stakeholders it would involve and what 
impact it could have on the development of the 
EU Arctic policy is so far unknown. 
Third, the Communication concludes with 
proposals for establishing a Working Party on 
Arctic Matters and Northern Cooperation in the 
Council and a similar delegation in the European 
Parliament. In the diverse EU-Arctic nexus and 
in light of the complexity of the EU itself, more 
long-lasting platforms for exchanging ideas and 
information are welcome. However, the 
marginal character of Arctic policy in the EU 
suggests that these coordination venues – if ever 
established – are unlikely to host particularly 
energetic debates. 
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One disappointing feature is the EU 
policymakers’ weak engagement with indigenous 
peoples and local Arctic inhabitants regarding 
EU Arctic-relevant activities. The text of the 
Communication pushes indigenous peoples’ 
issues into the “dialogue” corner, rather than 
raising up their specific concerns throughout the 
various policy fields discussed in the document. 
That is not uncommon as indigenous affairs are 
often constrained in policy debates and 
documents to what is considered local and 
traditional, thereby limiting indigenous influence 
on major political decision-making. Ideally, the 
overarching EU Arctic policy-making could 
have as one of its key contributions creating 
spaces for engaging Arctic actors who are likely 
to be marginalized in broader EU decision-
making processes. In particular, the role of the 
only Arctic indigenous people inhabiting EU 
territory, the Sámi is not highlighted at all, and it 
would be fairly natural to consider indigenous 
perspectives when discussing innovation, SMEs, 
renewables or bioeconomy. For instance, young 
indigenous entrepreneurs and nature-based 
industries are seen as key vehicles for viable 
indigenous communities.  
In a more circumpolar context, annual Arctic 
Dialogue meetings are mentioned and they have 
been appreciated by Arctic indigenous 
organizations, but concrete outputs of this 
format have been so far hardly visible. 
Furthermore, the EU is traditionally rather silent 
on engagement with other Arctic inhabitants 
than indigenous peoples. Perhaps the EU Arctic 
Policy Dialogue and Outreach process could fill 
this gap. 
Summary 
In sum, we can see the evolution of the EU’s 
Arctic policy towards a greater focus on the 
challenges specific to the European Arctic. 
There are also some concrete proposals for a 
better coordination of EU Arctic-relevant 
funding and inter-sectoral communication 
within EU institutions (the Council and the EP). 
But the Communication reveals also potentially 
problematic aspects of the EU’s future 
engagement in the North. First, environmental 
issues are hidden behind sustainability and 
innovation language, which obscures real 
dilemmas and value choices that need to be 
made in Europe’s northern localities that 
experience structural and demographic 
challenges. Many actors in the region still hope 
for (and many fear) possible expansion of 
extractive sectors in the future. The 
Communication’s silence on hydrocarbons and 
minerals will not make these dilemmas go away. 
Also, innovation cannot be presented as an easy 
answer to every challenge, value conflict or 
contradiction. Second, the focus on investment 
financing can lead to limiting direct programme 
support for structurally disadvantaged regions in 
the future. The first problematic aspect will 
remain with us for decades to come, the second 
is likely to become a battleground in the coming 
years, both in Brussels and in the North. 
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In the last part of our analysis of the EU’s new 
Communication on Arctic matters we focus on 
the international and global dimension of the 
new statement. Hence, we ask how the EU sees 
its place and role in pan-Arctic cooperation. 
Safe and Stable – 
European 
Neighbourhoods and a 
Global Strategy 
According to the Communication’s very first 
paragraph, a “safe, stable, sustainable and 
prosperous Arctic is important (…) for the 
European Union”, with the Union having a 
“strategic interest in playing a key role in the 
Arctic region”. Why is it so important for the 
EU that the Arctic region remains a “zone of 
peace, prosperity and constructive international 
cooperation”?  
The functionality of the European Union is 
determined by its various neighbourhoods and 
frontier areas. Instability, chaos and/or 
unpredictability in these regions significantly 
influence the Union’s internal stability, posing 
challenges to the very existence of the Union as 
such. At the moment, the migration and refugee 
crisis along Europe’s southern borders serves as 
a constant reminder of how external threats are 
having a lasting and distressing impact on the 
EU’s internal stability. In a nutshell, in today’s 
post-Cold War environment, internal and 
external elements of security and stability are 
inextricably linked. Hence, it is in Europe’s very 
own interests to create neighbourhoods of 
stability and predictability. 
From a conceptual perspective, adopted security 
strategies provide the framework that identify a 
particular security environment, key challenges 
and related policy implications. With the last 
European Security Strategy (ESS) (European 
Council 2003) already 13 years old, the HR is 
currently developing a new Global Strategy on 
Foreign and Security Policy that should guide 
the EU’s global action in the future. Unlike the 
ESS, the new Global Strategy will also cover the 
Arctic and the essential question how to deepen 
and reinforce the prevailing cooperative 
relationships in the region (Raspotnik 2016). 
Additionally, the EU’s approach to the Arctic 
can be seen in light of the 2014 Maritime 
Security Strategy (Council 2014). Accordingly, 
security has been understood in a broad manner 
that also encompasses environmental security. 
Arctic waters are mentioned as an area of 
particular importance, alongside the EU’s 
adjacent seas and the Atlantic Ocean. Following 
EU interests, the Union commits to “maritime 
multilateralism”, i.e. cooperation with all 
interested parties. The mutual respect of 
international law and rules is considered key in 
this regard. The new Arctic Communication 
mirrors this approach, stating that the EU will 
engage “in a strategic dialogue with Arctic 
stakeholders and third countries on security 
matters and by promoting continued rules-based 
governance at sea”. 
The Northern 
Neighbourhood 
Over the last decade, the Arctic region turned 
from an allegedly geopolitically and geo-
economically ‘hot’ Arctic into a realistically ‘cold’ 
Arctic (Stepien & Raspotnik 2015). Initially, the 
region’s volatile state of affairs had been 
characterised as a state of chaos, dominated by 
the competition over natural resources and 
maritime routes with states facing each other in 
a Wild West style (e.g. Zellen 2009). This 
perception of the Arctic – Europe’s northern 
III. WHAT ABOUT ARC-
TIC COOPERATION?  
A SMALL EU FISH IN  
A BIG ARCTIC POND 
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frontier – led to an increased interest in Arctic 
affairs within the hallways of EU power. Ever 
since 2008, the EU’s various institutional actors 
– the European Commission, the Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament 
– have published policy documents that outlined 
the different ideas about the EU-Arctic nexus. 
Interdependence was key to all of these seven 
documents. The Arctic does not only affect 
Europe but is essentially also affected by 
Europe. Climate change in the Arctic does not 
originate in the circumpolar North but has its 
causes in the industrialised regions of the world. 
In turn, climate change in the Arctic does not 
end at the Arctic Circle but magnifies global 
climate change. 
The New 
Communication and 
Arctic Cooperation 
The emphasis on mutual interdependence 
between the EU and the Arctic region also 
characterises the new Joint Communication on 
“An integrated European Union policy for the 
Arctic”. Not least, one of the functions of the 
EU’s Arctic policy is to serve as a regional sub-
policy for the Union’s broader strategic outlook 
as it is going to be presented in the Global 
Strategy (Raspotnik 2016). 
The policy paper starts from the premise that 
although the Arctic states have a primary 
responsibility for addressing issues within their 
territories, many Arctic challenges can be more 
effectively addressed through regional or 
multilateral cooperation. Unsurprisingly, the 
Communication mentions the usual suspects in 
that regard and emphasises the now-established 
‘same old’ cooperative and engaged position of 
the EU towards the following governance 
frameworks:  
• The Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 
provides a framework to manage the Arctic, and 
the EU will seek strategic dialogue with both 
Arctic stakeholders and third countries to ensure 
compliance with the Convention; 
• The Arctic Council is the primary forum for 
regional cooperation and the EU will continue 
to engage in all niches and corners of the Arctic 
Council (and eventually become an accredited 
observer), in addition hoping that the Finnish 
chairmanship “will offer an opportunity to bring 
European ideas and initiatives” to its work; 
• The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the 
Union’s very own Northern Dimension, the 
Nordic Council and the UN Economic 
Arctic Council’s Senior Arctic Officials’ meeting in Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, 26 March 
2014. Clear division between Arctic states and permanent participants (at the table) and 
observers in the back. Image credit: Arctic Council Secretariat / Linnea Nordström  
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Commission for Europe on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution are also important 
regional cooperation frameworks that continue 
to be supported by the EU. 
Additionally, the Joint Communication stresses 
the Union’s engagement in issues of direct 
relevance to the Arctic at international level, 
particularly via the United Nations. For example, 
a EU Arctic policy is considered an “important 
element” in implementing the COP 21 
agreement (Paris Agreement). 
Ocean Governance 
and Fisheries 
The EU’s approach towards the international 
framework for the Arctic Ocean needs to be 
discussed in the broader context of the Union’s 
current process of formulating its approach to 
international ocean governance. The key venue 
for EU action will be the UN negotiations on a 
possible new UNCLOS implementing 
agreement covering biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (high seas), which are 
commencing at the time of writing. The EU is 
likely to take a position on a strong international 
governance framework, including alleviating 
hindrances for establishing marine protected 
areas in high seas areas. The new 
Communication reflects this position when it 
states that a future framework for the Arctic 
Ocean and its high seas should “include a new 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
[RFMO] or Arrangement, combined with a new 
Regional Sea Convention, to ensure the long-
term conservation and sustainable use of 
resources in the Arctic high seas”. This 
statement should be read in light of recent Arctic 
developments. First, there is an on-going work 
in the Arctic Council as regards Arctic marine 
governance, with a regional seas agreement 
initially considered as one possible option 
(currently, however, it appears to be off the 
table). Second, as regards fisheries, in 2015 the 
five Arctic Ocean coastal states (A5) signed a 
Declaration on Arctic high seas fisheries, 
unilaterally banning high seas fishing by own 
vessels until sufficient data on climate change 
impacts is available. At the same time, the A5 
saw no need for an Arctic Ocean RFMO in the 
near-term. Other fisheries actors, including the 
EU, were later invited to join this dialogue, 
which materialized at a meeting in Washington, 
D.C. in December 2015. The Communication 
welcomes the A5 Declaration, but the 
Commission and the HR stress that these 
developments concern an area beyond national 
jurisdiction. Hence, a potential RFMO needs to 
involve all major fishing nations in order to 
establish appropriate international measures. 
The Role of Science 
With climate change being the reason why the 
EU should be engaged in Arctic matters, 
research, science and innovation are considered 
the key component of how the EU aims to 
create regional credibility. In line with its 
previous approaches, research has been 
attributed the key role for effective cooperation 
between Arctic ‘insiders’ and Arctic ‘outsiders’. 
In the words of the Commission and the HR, 
“science can be used as a catalyst to support a 
common understanding, enabling jointly agreed 
solutions to be reached and foster[ing] peace 
[and] cooperation”. Throughout the Joint 
Communication, the Commission and the HR 
position the EU as a key partner for Arctic 
cooperation with research and science framed as 
the Union’s main regional contribution – facts 
that have been emphasised in the 2012 
Communication and its two add-ons. Moreover, 
scientific cooperation also has the potential to 
strengthen the Union’s collaborative efforts 
towards its Arctic partners. 
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The EU and the Big 
Arctic Three 
The EU’s Arctic collaboration with Canada and 
the U.S. currently seems to be at its ‘Arctic’ high 
point. After losing the case at the WTO 
regarding the EU’s ban on the trade in 
commercial seal products (Regulation (EC) No 
1007/2009), Canada has stopped blocking the 
accreditation of the Union’s observer status in 
the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the three 
partners established enhanced maritime 
(Atlantic and Arctic) science cooperation in the 
framework of the Galway Statement - a clear 
example of the importance of science diplomacy 
and scientific presence in the Arctic for actors 
external to the region (which includes the EU as 
regards the Arctic Ocean). 
The relations with Russia – tainted by the on-
going crisis in Ukraine and mutual sanction 
regimes - are less a reason for celebration. 
Eventually, it was Russian resistance that 
prevented the EU from concluding the Arctic 
Council (non)-observer-ship saga during the 
Iqaluit Ministerial Meeting in 2015. Yet, the new 
Joint Communication opens up the possibility 
for cooperation with Russia. According to the 
Union’s HR Federica Mogherini, the policy 
update is part of the principle of selective 
engagement between the EU and Russia as 
recently agreed on by the foreign ministers of the 
EU-28 and the HR (Eriksson 2016). 
Summary 
In sum, the Joint Communication’s 
‘performance’ concerning the area of 
‘international cooperation’ will not surprise an 
EU-Arctic-policy-informed reader. Based on its 
early Arctic experiences and the turmoil 
following suggestion of an Arctic Treaty based 
on the Antarctic template (EP 2008 Resolution) 
and the emphasis on “enhanced governance” 
(Commission 2008 Communication), the 
Union’s Arctic steps ever since then have been 
shaped by terminological diligence and an 
overall cautious approach that rather defines the 
Union as Arctic suppliant than equal Arctic 
actor. An analysis of the 2012 Joint 
Communication finds the “EU’s unwillingness 
to step on the toes of any of the Arctic states by 
remaining largely unspecific, pushing back 
Signing of the Galway Statement on 24.03.2013. Source: European Commission 2013. 
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against the perception of the EU as a “super-
regulator” and concentrating on environmental, 
climate change and research issues, supporting 
any effort to ensure the effective stewardship of 
the Arctic environment” (Keil & Raspotnik 
2012). This conclusion also holds true for the 
2016 Joint Communication. Eventually, science 
seems to be the internally agreed upon key 
should finally open the Arctic governance and 
cooperation door. The door to a neighbourhood 
that is generally perceived as peaceful and stable, 
embedded in a distinct cooperative 
environment. Accordingly, also the currently 
developed Global Strategy will essentially stress 
the cooperative path the EU wants to take in the 
Arctic region, with the Union contributing to 
soft security issues such as research, science and 
infrastructure (Raspotnik 2016).  
  
Infographic: European Commission, 2016, Twitter #EUArctic. 
ArCticles – May 2016 – Adam Stępień and Andreas Raspotnik 18 
 
 
 
 
The new Joint Communication on the EU’s 
Arctic policy generally follows the lines drawn in 
previous EU Arctic policy statements: climate 
and environment, sustainability and regional 
cooperation. Additionally, the policy update also 
includes sings of evolution regarding the EU’s 
understanding of regional developments and of 
the Union’s place in the changing Arctic 
economic, environmental and political 
landscape.  
The Communication does not deliver on the 
promise included in its title, namely that it 
proposes to establish a truly “integrated EU 
Arctic policy”. Integration - in the most 
common understanding of the word - would 
entail formulating a set of common objectives 
for various EU actions, jointly managing them 
(perhaps even as a single policy), and providing 
various Arctic-relevant sectoral policies with a 
common set of principles. The EU Arctic policy 
encompasses too many diverse issues – both 
internal and external – and it is too marginal for 
the EU in order to realistically aim for the 
envisaged integration. The unhelpful word 
“integrated” obscures both tangible outputs 
proposed in the new policy statement as well as 
various problematic issues. As a general policy 
statement, the Communication is vague on many 
issues and lacks concrete ideas how various goals 
are to be exactly achieved. The Communication 
remains primarily a list of on-going actions and 
existing commitments. Moreover, the 
Communication still confusingly mixes issues 
specific to Arctic Ocean and to the European 
northernmost regions, which is likely to lead to 
a degree of confusion among its different 
audiences. 
The EU Arctic policy is clearly evolving towards 
a greater focus on the challenges specific for the 
European Arctic. Here, the main emphasis is on 
economic development, traditionally packed in 
the language of sustainability. The vision of the 
Arctic’s future moved now away from the 
overblown expectations of rapidly expanding 
maritime shipping and hydrocarbon extraction. 
As a result, the attention shifts to economic 
activities that show more promise and are less 
likely to cause harm to fragile Arctic 
environment. These are embedded in themes of 
innovation, entrepreneurship, circular economy, 
bioeconomy, and renewables. Europe’s 
northernmost regions are expected to contribute 
to the development of cold climate technologies 
and – of course sustainable – Arctic-ready 
solutions. North-South transport connections 
and digital accessibility are to support these 
developments, although a lack of any clear 
commitments remains. Furthermore, the new 
Communication also includes suggestions on 
the general shift in the EU support from regional 
development funding to investment financing 
and loans. The latter may be problematic for 
many European Arctic stakeholders. 
Concrete ideas for better coordination of EU 
Arctic-relevant funding have been proposed, 
namely the forum for European Arctic 
authorities at various levels and network of 
managers of EU funding programmes. Silence 
on participation of indigenous peoples in these 
frameworks is, however, disturbing. If 
successful, these fora may produce overarching 
objectives for EU support in the North. 
Furthermore, the Commission and the High 
Representative suggest the Council and the 
Parliament to strengthen their respective 
internal coordination of Arctic affairs.  
As regards international cooperation, the 
Union’s Arctic steps - ever since the early 
unfortunate statements on, inter alia, an Arctic 
treaty - are shaped by terminological diligence 
and an overall cautious approach that rather 
defines the Union as Arctic suppliant than equal 
Arctic actor. Thus, the EU is careful not to be 
perceived as a super-regulator or normative 
preacher, focusing on climate change, 
environmental issues and its own positive 
CONCLUSION  
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contribution to Arctic cooperation. Science 
seems to be the internally agreed-on key that 
aims to finally open the Arctic 
governance/cooperation door. 
The EU is now drawing its new Global Strategy 
and the North/Arctic is generally considered 
one of few positive directions in the EU’s ever 
more precarious international environment. The 
Union’s main contribution to this environment 
will be via soft security measures, such as 
delivering on science and infrastructure. The 
very basis on how and where to further 
cooperate in the Arctic was now illustrated in the 
new Joint Communication. 
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